A eficiência e cr´íticas sobre a Escola de Chigaco
Keywords:
Ordem Econômica, Regulação Econômica, Defesa da Concorrência, Eficiência, Poder de MercadoAbstract
This article analyzes efficiency as a criterion for excluding unlawfulness of the economic agent with market dominance, according to art. 36 of the Brazilian Law for the Defense of Competition, in view of the hermeneutical approach of the Chicago School and its contemporary critics, especially the Neo-Brandeisian Movement. To this end, through a deductive and exploratory methodology, with research in legislation and national and international doctrine related to the subject, the criterion for excluding unlawfulness is addressed, analyzing efficiency, regarding to the economic agent with market dominance, according to art. 36 of the Brazilian Law for the Defense of Competition, in view of the national constitutional regulation. Next, an investigation is carried out on efficiency in the hermeneutics promoted by the Chicago School. Subsequently, it analyzes the critics, specially from the 1970s onwards, of the interpretations of that School, mostly through the neo-Brandeisian Movement, to finally conclude the importance of comparing other analytical methods besides productive and allocative efficiency for a comprehensive analysis of art. 36 of the Brazilian Law of Defense of Competition from the perspective of the Federal Constitution of 1988, using, for this purpose, the instruments provided by critics of the Chicago School, for a concept of efficiency that is not only economic, but also normative for optimizing what is expressed in art. 170 of the Magna Carta, the main rule of the Brazilian economic order.
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