GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO Y LA OPINIÓN DEL AUDITOR: EVIDENCIA PORTUGUESA (2008-2011)

Autores/as

  • Marília Medeiros Santos Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro
  • Helena Coelho Inácio Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro
  • Elisabete F. Simões Vieira Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4270/ruc.20153150-168

Palabras clave:

auditoría, teoría de la agencia, gobierno corporativo, opinión del auditor

Resumen

Este estudio analizó el efecto de la propiedad de las empresas en la estructura de los informes de auditoría, así como el efecto que ciertas características relacionadas con el gobierno corporativo tienen en informes de auditoría. Para cumplir con el objetivo, se utiliza el modelo de regresión logística, teniendo en cuenta una muestra de empresas portuguesas no financieras cotizadas en Euronext Lisbon durante el período comprendido entre 2008 y 2011. Nuestros resultados mostraron que la concentración de la propiedad, la independencia del consejo de administración, la presencia de un comité de auditoría y el ratio de liquidez, son factores que tienen influencia positiva en la opinión de auditoría, promoviendo una información financiera más fiable. En el contexto portugués, los resultados no generan, en términos generales, el mismo efecto que los marcos teóricos de gobierno de las sociedades anglosajonas defienden. Sin embargo, contribuye a una mejor comprensión e interés en esta línea de investigación, dada la actualidad del tema y la falta de trabajo realizado en Portugal acerca de este tema.

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Biografía del autor/a

Marília Medeiros Santos, Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro

Mestre em Contabilidade pelo ISCA-UA

Helena Coelho Inácio, Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro

Doutorada pela Universidade Autónoma de Madrid em Contabilidade e Organização de empresas com uma tese na área de auditoria;

Lecciona no Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro desde 1988 disciplinas na área de auditoria ao nível da licenciatura, mestrado e doutoramento.

Elisabete F. Simões Vieira, Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro

Doutorada pelo ISCTE em Finanças;

Lecciona no Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração da Universidade de Aveiro desde 1990 disciplinas na área de gestão ao nível da licenciatura e mestrado.

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Publicado

2015-11-27

Cómo citar

Santos, M. M., Inácio, H. C., & Vieira, E. F. S. (2015). GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO Y LA OPINIÓN DEL AUDITOR: EVIDENCIA PORTUGUESA (2008-2011). Revista Universo Contábil, 11(3), 150–168. https://doi.org/10.4270/ruc.20153150-168

Número

Vol. 11 Núm. 3 (2015)

Sección

Sección Internacional

Licencia

Los derechos de autor de los artículos publicados en esta revista son del autor, y los derechos de primera publicación son de la revista. Por aparecer en esta revista de acceso público los artículos son de uso gratuito, con atribuciones específicas, en aplicaciones educativas y no comerciales. La revista permitirá el uso de trabajos publicados con fines no comerciales, incluso el derecho a enviar el trabajo a bases de datos de acceso público.