MANAGERS’ENTRENCHMENT AND POWER

Authors

  • Jorge José Martins Rodrigues ISCAL
  • Nelson José dos Santos António ISCTE/IUL

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4270/ruc.20106

Keywords:

Managers’ entrenchment. Discretionary power. Corporate governance.

Abstract

Strategies that top managers implement to make them indispensables to the organizations, are known as entrenchment. This concept is little studied in corporate governance. These strategies seem to be a reaction of top managers to the different mechanisms of control, internal or external, and a necessary and compulsory path for those who wish to amplify their discretionary capacity. The entrenchment of top managers isn't a formal statute or official recognizance; it happens in a net of informal relationships that manager's control. It allows top managers to increase their own power near the stakeholders. Therefore, such power tends to be perceived as having an illegal power source. However, entrenchment of top managers isn't necessarily inefficient, it can be of benefit as long as it contributes value creation and to the development of the organization as a whole. Thus, it was tried to trace the path taken by this line of research in the recent past and to contribute to the promotion of empirical studies to strengthen this theme with results emanating from the organizations' practices.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biographies

Jorge José Martins Rodrigues, ISCAL

Doutor em Gestão pelo ISCTE/IUL. Professor do Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração de Lisboa do Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa - ISCAL/IPL

Nelson José dos Santos António, ISCTE/IUL

Doutor em Gestão de Empresas pela  Bergishe Universitat Wuppertal. Professor Catedrático do Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresado Instituto Universitário de Lisboa - ISCTE/IUL

Published

2010-09-16

How to Cite

Rodrigues, J. J. M., & António, N. J. dos S. (2010). MANAGERS’ENTRENCHMENT AND POWER. Revista Universo Contábil, 6(3), 129–139. https://doi.org/10.4270/ruc.20106

Issue

Section

International Section